Introduction 4 5
decision processing time, a pattern that was also seen in human participants. Second, if 9 9 confidence is quantified after a period of post-decision accumulation, a stopping criterion is 1 0 0 needed, similar to the decision boundary for first-order choices. Here, using a manipulation of 1 0 1 evidence volatility, we shed light on the question whether human participants use a time-1 0 2 based stopping rule (i.e., terminate sampling after a certain amount of time) or an evidence-1 0 3 based stopping rule (i.e., terminate sampling after the accumulated evidence reached a 1 0 4 certain threshold value). Following recent work that has modeled confidence as post-decision evidence 1 0 8 accumulation (Calder-Travis et al., 2020; Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010 ; Van Den Berg et 1 0 9
al., 2016), we reasoned that confidence reports may differ, depending on whether they are 1 1 0 probed around the time of the response (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Zylberberg et al., 2016) Busemeyer, 2010; Yu et al., 2015) . In both cases, we propose, confidence reflects the 1 1 3 probability of being correct, given the choice and accumulated evidence up until that point. 1 1 4
The heat map in Fig. 1A reflects the probability of being correct given evidence (Y-axis) and 1 1 5 time (X-axis), conditional on the choice (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Zylberberg et al., 2016) . 1 1 6
The current heat map shows this probability conditional on reaching the upper boundary (i.e., 1 1 7 an "up" choice). Note that the heat map is flipped over the abscissa when the lower boundary 1 1 8 is reached instead (i.e., a "down" choice). Thus, confidence in our model reflects the 1 1 9 probability of being correct, given choice, evidence (potentially post-choice) and time. With 1 2 0 respect to Signature 1 (an interaction between evidence strength and choice accuracy), our 1 2 1 model simulations show that confidence increases for both corrects and errors when 1 2 2 confidence is quantified at the time the bound is reached ( Figure 1B) , whereas the interaction 1 2 3 between evidence strength and choice accuracy emerges when confidence is queried later in 1 2 4 time ( Figure 1C-D) . In the following, we will test these predictions in human participants 1 2 5 during random dot motion discrimination with additional confidence ratings. Twenty-six human participants were presented with dynamic random dot motion and 1 3 9
were asked on each trial to decide as fast and accurate as possible whether a subset of dots 1 4 0 was coherently moving towards the left or the right side of the screen (Gold and Shadlen, 1 4 1 2007). The difficulty of these decisions was manipulated by varying the proportion of 1 4 2 coherently moving dots. Five different levels of coherence were used, ranging from 0 up to 1 4 3 .4, all of which were randomly intermixed within a block. We also manipulated the volatility of 1 4 4 motion coherence over the course of a single trial. Specifically, on each frame, the input 1 4 5 coherence was either sampled from a Gaussian distribution with SD = 0 (low volatility), or 1 4 6 from a Gaussian distribution with SD = .256 (high volatility) around the generative coherence. 1 4 7
In the high volatility condition, additional noise is thus introduced in the decision process. 1 4 8
Previous work has shown that this manipulation, which speeds up RTs and increases 1 4 9 confidence, is diagnostic for an evidence-based stopping rule for immediate decisions 1 5 0 (Zylberberg et al., 2016) . We here used this manipulation to shed light on the stopping rule 1 5 1 for delayed confidence reports. 1 5 2
In order to query the dynamics of post-decision processing and its influence on the 1 5 3 diagnostic signatures of confidence (cf. Figure 1B -D), confidence reports were collected in a 1 5 4 different way depending on the block (see Figure 2 ). In the immediate condition participants 1 5 5 jointly indicated their choice (left or right) and their level of confidence (guess correct, 1 5 6 probably correct or certainly correct) via a single response. In the delayed condition, 1 5 7 participants first indicated their choice (left or right), and then after a 1s blank screen or 1s of 1 5 8 continued motion (same coherence, volatility and motion direction as the initial stimulus) they 1 5 9 indicated the level of confidence in their choice on a six-point scale. To unravel how coherence and volatility affected latent cognitive variables in the 1 6 9 decision process, we fitted choices and reaction times using a hierarchical version of the drift 1 7 0 diffusion framework (Wiecki et al., 2013) . Because the effects of coherence and volatility 1 7 1 were not modulated by the timing of confidence reports (immediate vs delayed) for both RTs, 1 7 2 F < 1, Bayes Factor (BF) = .008, and accuracy, F < 1, BF = .01, the RT and accuracy data 1 7 3 were combined. First, as typically observed in random dot motion tasks, drift rates increased 1 7 4 monotonically with coherence level (see Figure 3A ), with significant differences in drift rate 1 7 5 between all coherence levels (averaged across volatility levels), ps < .001. Estimated drift 1 7 6 rates did not depend on the level of evidence volatility, ps > .119. Second, as we predicted 1 7 7 (Zylberberg et al., 2016) , our manipulation of within-trial evidence volatility was captured by 1 7 8 the within-trial drift variability parameter σ (see Figure 3B ; Methods). When averaged over 1 7 9 different coherences, estimated within-trial variability was higher for high compared to low 1 8 0 volatility, p = .014 (pair-wise comparisons within each coherence value: 0% coherence: p = 1 8 1 .091; 5% coherence: p = .049; 10% coherence: p = .259; 20% coherence: p = .106; 40% 1 8 2 coherence: p = .457). Next, we used our model fits to obtain qualitative and quantitative predictions of 2 0 4 confidence reports about the three dynamic signatures of confidence. In order to create a 2 0 5 heat map reflecting the probability of being correct, we simulated a large number of trials and 2 0 6 calculated average accuracy for each combination of time and evidence. Confidence 2 0 7 predictions were quantified by reading out the values from this heat map (reflecting the 2 0 8 probability of being correct) for each combination of evidence, time, and choice. 2 0 9
Signature 1: interaction between evidence strength and choice accuracy. The first 2 1 0 diagnostic signature of confidence established previously (Kepecs et al., 2008) , is an 2 1 1 increase of confidence with evidence strength for correct trials, but a decrease for error trials. 2 1 2
In the immediate condition, confidence increased with coherence level, F(4,44.81) = 15.62, p 2 1 3 < .001. Crucially, there was also the predicted interaction between coherence level and 2 1 4 choice accuracy, F(4,1990.70) = 14.09, p < .001. Confidence increased with evidence 2 1 5 strength for correct trials (linear contrast: p < .001), but there was no significant effect for 2 1 6 error trials (linear contrast: p = .070; see Figure 4A ). In contrast, as visualized in Figure 1B , 2 1 7 the model predicts that when confidence is quantified at the time when the decision boundary 2 1 8 is reached, confidence scales with coherence, F(4,25) = 14.14, p < .001, but there is no 2 1 9
interaction between coherence and choice accuracy, F(4,125.02) = 1.03, p = .39.
The above mismatch can easily be remedied by assuming that choice and confidence 2 2 1 cannot be computed simultaneously, for example due to a brief refractory period (Marti et al., 2 2 2 2015; Pashler, 1994). Indeed, when confidence was calculated with a small temporal delay 2 2 3 (100 ms, Figure 1C ; see Methods), the model did predict the interaction between coherence 2 2 4 and choice accuracy, F(4,200) = 84.05, p < .001. As in the behavioral data, the model with 2 2 5 the small temporal delay predicted increasing confidence with coherence for correct trials 2 2 6 (linear contrast: p < .001), but not for error trials (linear contrast: p = .541; Figure 4A ). In the 2 2 7 remainder, we will continue with predictions from the model with temporal delay. 2 2 8
In both delayed conditions, confidence scaled with coherence level (blank condition: 2 2 9 F(4,51.8) = 5.49, p < .001; extra evidence condition: F(4,4571.1) = 4.75, p < .001). In both 2 3 0 conditions, there was also an interaction between coherence and choice accuracy (blank 2 3 1 condition: F(4,3625.6) = 53.38, p < .001; extra evidence condition: F(4,4568.7) = 71.45, p < 2 3 2 .001). Within the correct trials, confidence increased with coherence levels (blank and extra 2 3 3 evidence conditions, linear contrasts: p < .001. Instead, within the error trials, confidence 2 3 4 decreased as a function of coherence (blank and extra evidence conditions, linear contrasts: 2 3 5 p = .001). This interaction was captured by a model which terminated post-decision 2 3 6 accumulation after a fixed amount of time (cf. Figure 1D ; Materials and Methods). This model 2 3 7 also showed the scaling of confidence with coherence (F(4,69.79) = 39.9, p < .001), as well 2 3 8 as the interaction with choice accuracy (F(4,225) = 1634.3, p < .001). Similar to the human 2 3 9
data, confidence increased with coherence for correct trials (linear contrast: p < .001) and 2 4 0 decreased for error trials (linear contrast: p < .001; figure 4B ). Finally, there was a three-way 2 4 1 interaction between coherence, choice accuracy and interrogation condition (data: If confidence is quantified after additional post-decision processing, a stopping rule 2 8 2 has to be implemented determining at which point in time confidence is quantified. In the 2 8 3 previous simulations, following previous research a time-based stopping rule was 2 8 4
implemented (Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010; Yu et al., 2015) . Specifically, confidence was 2 8 5 quantified after a specified amount of time has passed. An alternative implementation, 2 8 6 however, is that the stopping rule for confidence reports is evidence-based, just like the 2 8 7 stopping rule for the preceding choice process (Moran et al., 2015) . According to this 2 8 8 evidence-based stopping rule, after reaching the initial choice threshold, agents impose a 2 8 9 second threshold and a delayed confidence report is given when this second threshold is 2 9 0 reached. Because the static signatures discussed before do not arbitrate between the two 2 9 1 delayed confidence stopping criteria (see Supplementary Materials) , we next turn towards 2 9 2 our manipulation of evidence volatility. Previous work has shown that an evidence-based 2 9 3 model can explain the volatility effect on confidence for immediate confidence judgments 2 9 4 (Zylberberg et al., 2016). We reasoned that the same manipulation could be used to 2 9 5 disentangle a time-based versus an evidence-based stopping rule for delayed confidence 2 9 6 judgments. For immediate confidence reports, model predictions closely capture the pattern seen 3 0 9
in human confidence ratings (see Figure 5A ). Confidence monotonically increased with 3 1 0 coherence levels (data: F(4,22) = 27.47, p < .001; model: F(4,22) = 27.68, p < .001), and was 3 1 1 higher with high evidence volatility (data: F(1,25) = 41.19, p < .001; model: F(1,25) = 9.90, p 3 1 2 = .004). Similar to RTs, the effect of evidence volatility on confidence was most pronounced 3 1 3 with low coherence values (data: F(4,22) = 4.46, p = .008; model: F(4,22) = 30.79, p < .001). 3 1 4
To easily interpret this effect, Figure 5C shows differences between the low and high volatility 3 1 5 condition. As can be seen, for both model and data, confidence was increased with high 3 1 6 evidence volatility, particularly with low coherence values. 3 1 7
For delayed confidence reports, the data favored the evidence-based stopping rule 3 1 8 over the time-based stopping rule (see Figure 5B and 6D). The data and both models 3 1 9
showed a monotonic increase of confidence with coherence levels (data extra evidence: reports were similar irrespective of whether post-decision evidence or a blank screen was 3 2 9
presented following the choice (data not shown). This was further confirmed by an analysis 3 3 0 including post-decision evidence (extra evidence or blank), which did not show a three-way 3 3 1 interaction, F < 1, BF = .037. 3 3 2 Figure 5D suggests that the effect of volatility on confidence for the lowest coherence 3 3 3 values is even stronger than predicted by the model with the evidence-based stopping rule. 3 3 4
This is most likely because the sigma parameter, which captures evidence volatility, was 3 3 5 estimated based on choices and RTs only (i.e., not based on confidence). Therefore, our 3 3 6 predictions about immediate and delayed confidence are entirely constrained by the decision 3 3 7 process itself. Some evidence hints at the possibility that post-decision accumulation is 3 3 8 different from pre-decision accumulation (Yu et al., 2015) . In the current context, it could 3 3 9 therefore be that post-decision processing from memory amplifies noise in the sampling 3 4 0 process. Indeed, when simulating the model with an evidence-based stopping rule using a 3 4 1 slightly increased sigma value in the high volatility condition (σ = .575), it captures the pattern 3 4 2 in the data even more tightly (see Figure 5D ). This finding is in line with the possibility that 3 4 3 post-decision accumulation is not fully determined by the pre-decision choice process. Normative models explain the sense of confidence in a decision as the probability of a 3 4 6 choice being correct. Although such formalization is principled and fruitful, it remains unclear 3 4 7 whether and how it can account for dynamic expressions of confidence. To investigate this, 3 4 8
we formalized confidence within an evidence accumulation framework as the probability of 3 4 9 being correct, given the accumulated evidence up until that point. We tested model 3 5 0 predictions concerning three diagnostic signatures of confidence, most notably an interaction 3 5 1 between evidence strength and choice accuracy, both for immediate and delayed confidence 3 5 2
reports. There was a close correspondence between model and human data for all three 3 5 3 signatures, showing that these signatures of confidence depend on the time at which 3 5 4 confidence is queried. 3 5 5
Dynamic signatures of decision confidence 3 5 6
Static models have conceptualized confidence as the probability of being correct 3 5 7 (Kepecs et al., 2008; Maniscalco and Lau, 2012; Sanders et al., 2016) . Intuitively, when 3 5 8 option A has a high (vs low) probability of being the correct answer, the model will give 3 5 9 response A with high (vs low) confidence. One advantage of such a formalization is that it 3 6 0 predicts three qualitative signatures of confidence (Sanders et al., 2016) . A limitation of such 3 6 1 an account is that this framework is inherently static, and therefore does not take time into 3 6 2 account. To resolve this, we relied instead on a dynamic evidence accumulation framework 3 6 3 to probe these different signatures across time. We are not the first to account for confidence 3 6 4 within an evidence accumulation framework (Kiani et al., 2014; Moran et al., 2015; Pleskac 3 6 5 and Busemeyer, 2010; Ratcliff and Starns, 2013; Zylberberg et al., 2016) . Previous work has 3 6 6 conceptualized immediate confidence as the probability of being correct given evidence and 3 6 7 elapsed time (Kiani et al., 2014; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Zylberberg et al., 2016) . Choices 3 6 8 are formed when evidence reaches a fixed decision threshold, and both choice and 3 6 9
confidence are quantified when this threshold is reached. As shown in Figure 1B , such a 3 7 0 model does not predict an interaction between evidence strength and choice accuracy, a 3 7 1 prediction at odds with many existing datasets. To account for this, in the current approach 3 7 2 we allowed the evidence to continue accumulation following boundary crossing. By 3 7 3 quantifying confidence across time, our model was able to account for these discrepancies. 3 7 4 Specifically, our model was able to explain signature 1, an interaction between evidence 3 7 5 strength and choice accuracy, in the immediate condition, as seen in behavioral data, by 3 7 6
assuming that immediate confidence is quantified with a small temporal delay from the 3 7 7
choice, suggesting a brief refractory period (Marti et al., 2015; Pashler, 1994) . Thus, an 3 7 8 important novel insight of the current work is that some form of post-decision evidence 3 7 9
accumulation is necessary, even to explain immediate confidence reports. at the time of the boundary crossing, confidence increases with evidence strength for both 3 8 9 corrects and errors, whereas the interaction effect only emerges with time. Crucially, this 3 9 0 pattern was also observed in the empirical data. This has important consequences for 3 9 1 studies relying on this signature to identify brain regions coding for decision confidence 3 9 2 (Kepecs et al., 2008; Kepecs and Mainen, 2012) . 3 9 3
Post-decision processing terminates using an evidence-based stopping rule 3 9 4
Post-decision evidence accumulation has been proposed as a mechanism explaining 3 9 5
confidence (Moran et al., 2015; Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010; Van Den Berg et al., 2016) 3 9 6 and biases in confidence judgments (Navajas et al., 2016) . It remains unclear, however, how 3 9 7 such a model decides when to stop accumulating evidence. The decision process itself is 3 9 8 of block seven and block ten (i.e., start of a new interrogation condition), participants 5 0 4 performed eight practice trials with .4 coherence using the procedure of the subsequent 5 0 5 block, to get familiarized with the response keys. These eight trials were repeated until 5 0 6 accuracy exceeded 75%. After each block, participants received feedback about their 5 0 7 performance in that block, including mean response time on correct trials, mean accuracy, 5 0 8 and the absolute value of the correlation between accuracy and confidence. Participants 5 0 9
were motivated to maximize these three values. 5 1 0
Statistical analyses 5 1 1
Behavioral data and model predictions were analyzed using mixed regression 5 1 2 modeling. This method allows analyzing data at the single-trial level. We fitted random 5 1 3 intercepts for each participant; error variance caused by between-subject differences was 5 1 4
accounted for by adding random slopes to the model. The latter was done only when this 5 1 5 significantly increased the model fit. RTs and confidence were analyzed using linear mixed 5 1 6 models, for which F statistics are reported and the degrees of freedom were estimated by 5 1 7
Satterthwaite's approximation (Kuznetsova et al., 2014) . Accuracy was analyzed using Fitting. Drift diffusion model parameters were estimated using hierarchical Bayesian 5 2 2 estimation within the HDDM toolbox (Wiecki et al., 2013) . The HDDM uses Markov-chain 5 2 3
Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling, which generates full posterior distributions over parameter 5 2 4 estimates, quantifying not only the most likely parameter value but also uncertainty 5 2 5 associated with each estimate. Due to the hierarchical nature of the HDDM, estimates for 5 2 6 individual subjects are constrained by group-level prior distributions. In practice, this results 5 2 7 in more stable estimates for individual subjects. For each model, we drew 100.000 samples 5 2 8
from the posterior distribution. The first ten percent of these samples were discarded as 5 2 9
burn-in and every second sample was discarded for thinning, reducing autocorrelation in the 5 3 0 chains. Group level chains were visually inspected to ensure convergence, i.e. ruling out 5 3 1 sudden jumps in the posterior and ruling out autocorrelation. Additionally, all models were 5 3 2 fitted three times, in order to compute the Gelman-Rubin R hat statistics (comparing within-5 3 3 chain and between-chain variance). We checked and confirmed that all group-level 5 3 4 parameters had an R hat between 0.98-1.02, showing convergence between these three 5 3 5
instantiations of the same model. Because individual parameter estimates are constrained by 5 3 6 group-level priors, frequentist statistics cannot be used because data are not independent. 5 3 7
The probability that a condition differs from another can be computed by calculating the 5 3 8 overlap in posterior distributions. 5 3 9
When fitting the data (choices and reaction times), both drift rate (v) and decision 5 4 0 bound (a) were allowed to vary as a function of coherence and evidence volatility, whereas 5 4 1 non-decision time (ter) was fixed across conditions. According to our hypothesis, the effect of 5 4 2 evidence volatility will be expressed in the within-trial variability parameter (σ). When fitting 5 4 3 the DDM this parameter is fixed (i.e., to .1 in the Ratcliff Diffusion model or to 1 in the 5 4 4 currently used HDDM). Because σ is a scaling factor, after fitting the model, we next scaled 5 4 5 drift rate, decision bound and within-trial variability for each condition so that decision bound 5 4 6 was equal to 1. Thus, this is approach allows estimating within-trial variability. Note that 5 4 7 under this approach, an implicit assumption is that the decision bound does not differ 5 4 8 between the different conditions. 5 4 9
Simulations. Using the estimates obtained from the HDDM fit, predictions were 5 5 0 generated using a random walk approximation of the diffusion process (Tuerlinckx et al., 5 5 1 2001). This method simulates a random walk process that starts at z*a (here, z was an 5 5 2 unbiased starting point of .5) and stops once the integrated evidence crosses 0 or a. At each 5 5 3 time interval t, a displacement Δ occurs with probability p and a displacement -Δ with 5 5 4 probability 1-p. Both quantities are given in equation (1). 5 5 5
Drift rate is given by μ , and within-trial variability is given by σ . In all simulations ߬ was 5 5 6 set to 1e-4. In order to construct the heat map representing the probability of being correct 5 5 7
shown in Figure 1 , 300.000 random walks without absorbing bounds were generated, with 5 5 8 drift rates sampled from a uniform distribution between zero and one. This assured sufficient 5 5 9
data points across the relevant part of the heat map. Subsequently, the average accuracy 5 6 0 was calculated for each (response time, evidence) combination, based on all trials that had a 5 6 1 data point for that (response time, evidence) combination. Smoothing was achieved by 5 6 2 aggregating over evidence windows of .01 and
